res.1456-le)
Doc. 10569
3 June 2005
Functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan
Report
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of
Co-rapporteurs: Andreas Gross, Switzerland, Socialist Group and Mr
Summary
The parliamentary elections that will be held in
Since the 2003 presidential elections, marred by fraud and violence, the stability in the country has been maintained at the expense of respect for fundamental human rights such as freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. In the present political climate, neither the electoral system nor key state institutions and the judiciary might be able to provide sufficient guarantees for fair elections. Furthermore, the important revenues that will be generated through the operation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline might create temptations for some officials and politicians to bypass democracy.
The report calls on the Azerbaijani authorities and opposition to recognise the importance of the forthcoming elections for the democratic future of the country and publicly and officially to commit themselves to non-violence and respect for basic human rights. It urges the authorities to pursue in practice some positive recent steps such as the Presidential decree on the guarantees for democratic elections, the creation of public service broadcasting and the first modest attempts at political dialogue between the ruling parties and the opposition.
I. Draft resolution
1. In November 2005,
2. The Assembly welcomes the Presidential decree of 11 May 2005 calling on the authorities to ensure that the parliamentary elections will be held in accordance with the Electoral Code of the
3. However, the decree only reiterates principles that are already enshrined in the relevant Azerbaijani legislation. It is therefore their implementation that will determine to what extent the November elections will be qualified as free and fair.
4. Since the 2003 presidential elections, marred by fraud and violence, the stability in the country has been maintained at the expense of respect for fundamental human rights such as freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. No opposition rallies have been allowed and the electronic media have been under tight government control. The arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters continue. Although the seven political leaders imprisoned following the October 2003 events were pardoned by the President on 20 March 2005, they remain deprived of their civil rights after the Supreme Court upheld their convictions.
5. It is totally inadmissible that permissions for rallies are refused under the pretext of maintaining law and order and with the presumption that any rally would be at the origin of violence. There is a clear lack of understanding of the role and responsibility of police during mass events. A stable democracy can only be achieved through free and open political debate in the public sphere which is clearly lacking for the moment in
6. The recent, albeit modest, attempts at a political dialogue between the ruling parties and the opposition therefore deserve strong encouragement.
7. The Assembly welcomes the decision to transform the second State television channel (AzTV2) into a public service broadcasting, takes note of the first steps taken with the confirmation of a Board by Parliament and the subsequent election of its Director and expects it to start operating nationwide as soon as possible. It regrets that the first state television channel (AzTV1) will only be partially privatised and that the controlling package of shares remains in State hands. In
8. The Assembly strongly condemns the murder of Elmar Huseynov, editor of the weekly magazine Monitor and the climate of fear that this murder has spread across the opposition press. It deplores the legal and administrative harassment to which opposition newspapers continue to be subjected and the difficulties in setting up and operating independent and critical television channels.
9. The Assembly is concerned that in the present political climate, the electoral code and other relevant legislation may not provide sufficient guarantees for fair elections. It regrets the delay in the discussions between the Azerbaijani authorities and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the one hand and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the other hand, regarding amendments to the electoral code and the fact that some of the most politically important recommendations such as those regarding the composition of the electoral commissions have not been taken into account. Legal provisions concerning NGOs and venues for rallies also need to be improved.
10. The Assembly also doubts whether key State institutions have been sufficiently reformed so as to perform their functions in full compliance with democratic standards in the election process. Those include the Ministry of the Interior, where recent revelations about the criminal activities of a senior official only led to mild sanctions, the Supreme and Appeals Courts whose chairpersons were recently dismissed and the local administrations where the President has been ordering major reshuffles and has been criticising them for their performance.
11. Furthermore, the Assembly notes that
12. The inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline on 25 May 2005 offers prospects for an intensive economic and social development in
13. The Assembly therefore calls on the Azerbaijani authorities and opposition to recognise the importance of the forthcoming elections for the democratic future of the country and publicly and officially to commit themselves to non-violence and respect for basic human rights.
14. The Assembly calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to:
i. ensure immediately full respect of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression;
ii. more specifically, with regard to freedom of assembly, urgently comply with European standards and practice as regards the organisation of rallies and maintenance of law and order by the police and stop the practice of arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters based on the presumption that they are potential trouble-makers;
iii. with regard to pluralism of the media, speed up the starting of operation of the Public Television, endow it with appropriate resources and means of operation and abstain from any direct and indirect interference with its functioning and content, speed up the privatisation of AzTV 1 and ensure a transparent and fair procedure, make provisions for eventual full privatisation and, meanwhile, give it a public service remit ensuring balanced unbiased news coverage and guaranteeing media access of the opposition;
iv. with regard to freedom of expression, guarantee the free functioning of independent and opposition media and stop the practice of legal and administrative harassment and shed full light upon the murder of Elmar Huseynov;
v. with regard to the electoral code and other related legislation, amend it in full compliance with the joint Venice Commission/ODIHR recommendations, namely with regard to the composition of the electoral bodies, lower the amount of the registration fee per candidate, allow foreign-funded NGOs as observers and allow the holding of rallies;
vi. pursue political dialogue with all opposition parties before, during and after the elections.
15. The Assembly further invites the authorities of
i. speed up the reform of the judiciary and in particular, ensure that the qualification exams for new judges are held according to the planned timetable and in accordance with the law, revise the selection procedure for members of the Bar association and ensure that future exams are held in full compliance with European standards;
ii. with regard to the right to a fair trial, fully comply with Resolution … (2005) on the follow-up to Resolution 1359 (2004) on political prisoners in
iii. with regard to economic and social development, engage in a public debate, including all the main parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political forces, about the most important economic and social issues related to the distribution of the future oil revenues to the benefit of all the population, including the numerous refugees and internally displaced persons and pursue efforts to combat corruption and comply with international commitments in this respect.
16. The Assembly deeply appreciates the open and franc dialogue with the Azerbaijani parliamentary delegation and believes that this constructive co-operation will be essential in the run-up to the elections.
17. However, the Assembly will be unable to ratify the credentials of a new delegation in January 2006 if it was to represent a parliament resulting from an election which has not been considered free and fair by the international community.
18. The Assembly therefore resolves to:
i. observe the November 2005 parliamentary elections in close co-operation with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament and send an important number of observers;
ii. provide all parliamentary assistance that joint discussions with the Azerbaijani delegation identify as essential, such as training seminars for parliamentarians on the functions of a democratic parliament, the role of the opposition and the rules of procedure of parliament and organise exchanges of views with the participation of the political groups represented in the Assembly in order to share their experience of political dialogue in a democratic society with Azerbaijani parliamentarians and leading extra-parliamentary opposition members;
iii. co-ordinate its action in this field with the OSCE and the European Union.
II. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Gross and Mr Herkel
1. Introduction
1. At least two important events will happen in
2. At the beginning of November, the country will hold its second parliamentary elections since joining the Council of Europe. These elections represent a major test for the state of democracy in the country, especially as none of the previous elections – neither the parliamentary elections in 2000-2001, nor the presidential elections in 2003, nor the municipal elections in December 2004 – were considered by international observers as complying with democratic standards.
3. At the end of May, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a 2.9 billion USD investment able to transport up to one million barrels of crude oil daily from the Caspian sea to the world markets, will be officially inaugurated and will soon start pumping colossal amounts of money into the country. How this new wealth will be used and whether it will be distributed to the benefit of the entire population remains to be seen. The direct incidence on the elections is that the stakes with regard to power and money are very high and so are the chances of them being defended at any price, especially in an environment of widespread and massive-scale corruption.
4. Since the 2003 presidential elections, which were marred by massive fraud and violence, Ilham Aliyev, the son of the defunct president Heidar Aliev, and his entourage have managed to uphold stability in the country. The economy is booming, the GDP growth is one of the highest in the world. However, the economy is too much oil-dependent and 42% of the population still lives below the poverty level.
5. Even more worrying, this stability has been achieved at the expense of some basic human rights which
6. On 11 May 2005 the President of Azerbaijan issued a decree which called on the competent authorities to ensure that the parliamentary elections would be held in accordance with the Electoral Code of the
7. While the public commitment to the holding of free and fair elections can only be welcomed, it has to be noted that the decree simply reiterates principles that are already enshrined in the relevant legislation. It is therefore their implementation that will determine to what extent the elections can be qualified as democratic. And the reality for the moment is rather disturbing.
8. Practically no opposition rallies have been allowed since October 2003. Until recently, seven opposition leaders were in jail following the October 2003 events. They were eventually released through a Presidential pardon decree on 20 March 2005, to a great extent thanks to the efforts of the Parliamentary Assembly and the international community as a whole. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld their sentences, despite the fact that an OSCE report which had monitored their trials had concluded that there had been serious irregularities1. Hence, under the current legislation, they cannot participate in political activities.
9. The pre-election atmosphere is tense. Everybody has the recent events in
10. Freedom of expression has also been curtailed. One of the most critical journalists, the editor-in-chief of the Monitor magazine, Elmar Huseynov, was murdered on 2 March. The investigation is progressing slowly, but the results so far are considered unconvincing by the people closest to the journalist. The opposition newspapers are weak, with low circulation and are frequently harassed by the authorities. The model of a big influential and, most importantly, unbiased daily broadsheet is totally unknown to the country.
11. Concerning television, which is by far the most influential medium, the authorities deserve congratulation for finally taking the step of at least formally creating a public service broadcasting and deciding to privatise the State TV. Every encouragement and expert assistance will be needed in order to guarantee that both TVs start operating under their new remit as soon as possible and in the best possible conditions (the concept of public broadcasting is equally unfamiliar to a country where the airwaves have always been controlled by the state). For the moment, however, everything is as before when one switches the TV set on. The commercial channels are also generally loyal. Only one dissenting voice has appeared in recent months, that of ANSTV.
12. Having these elements in mind, we decided to concentrate our last visit to
13. The bare facts, as they stood, were for us unacceptable for a democracy in general and even more worrying from the perspective of parliamentary elections to be held in less than six months. We were anxious to find out how much determination there was amongst the state institutions and main political forces to change things for the better.
14. We have to say with regret that many of our interlocutors left us, to put it mildly, disappointed and unconvinced. This is why we decided to present this report and we sincerely hope that our Azeri friends will accept it as an expression of our deep concern, as a sort of alarm bell. Everything that needs to be done must be put in place now, before the start of the official election campaign at the beginning of July, in order to guarantee that the November 2005 parliamentary elections are a democratic success.
2. Elections
15. One of the most important commitments in the field of domestic legislation that Azerbaijan undertook upon accession was "to revise its legislation on elections, particularly the Law on the Central Electoral Commission and the Electoral Law, taking account of the recommendation put forward by the international observers during previous elections, so that the next general elections in autumn 2000 can confirm definitively the progress made and their results can be accepted by the majority of the political parties that will participate in the elections, and can be considered as free and fair by international observers" (Opinion No. 222 (2000)).
2.1. All the ballots held since accession have generally failed to meet basic democratic standards
16. The 5 November 2000 elections to the Milli Mejlis (Parliament), according to the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) indeed took place within an "improved legislative framework". However, the serious deficiencies in its implementation led the IEOM to conclude that the elections had fallen short of international standards, despite some improvements, in particular in enhancing political pluralism. The conclusion regarding the 7 January 2001 repeat parliamentary elections in
17. One of the most serious concerns raised by international observers was the lack of independence of local election commissions, which had been subject to interference, pressure and intimidation from the local authorities.
18. Numerous dysfunctions and procedural irregularities were observed also during the referendum on amending the constitution of 24 August 2002. The referendum shifted more power towards the President (such as the adoption of a purely majoritarian election system and the election of the President by absolute majority, instead of a qualified two thirds majority). The Venice Commission had not been officially consulted on the text and the organisation of the referendum and its earlier calls to introduce an effective parliamentary control over the activities of the executive were ignored.
19. In Resolution 1305 (2002) on honouring of obligations and commitments by Azerbaijan, the Assembly insisted that in the ongoing revision of the Electoral Code, all the recommendations of the Council of Europe experts should be scrupulously taken into consideration. This concerned in particular the provisions regulating the composition of the electoral commissions, the participation of local observers, the adjudication of electoral complaints, the registration of candidates, the accuracy of voters' lists, the training of the members of elections commissions and the transparency of the entire election process. The Assembly also urged the Azerbaijani authorities to ensure that the law in question guarantees equal access of all political parties to the electoral process and insisted that the forthcoming presidential elections be held – on the basis of the newly reformed Electoral Code – fully in respect of international standards.
20. Exactly the opposite happened. The presidential election of 15 October 2003 again failed to meet generally accepted international standards. The electoral process was not transparent; falsification of election results cast doubt on the credibility of the scale of Ilham Aliyev's victory; authoritarian practices like intimidation of voters, pressure on election commissioners or clear bias of the media in favour of the ruling party's candidate were commonplace. But the worst was still to come. Violence erupted on the day after the election. The excessive use of force by the Azerbaijani security forces resulted in the death of at least one protester and the injuring of hundreds of others.
21. The events of 16 and 17 October were accompanied and followed by waves of arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters and election officials and observers, as well as politically motivated dismissals. More than 100 people associated with the opposition, including a former prime minister of
22. The Assembly therefore, in its Resolution 1358 (2004) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan asked the authorities to officially acknowledge the serious irregularities that occurred during the 2003 election process, to investigate the shortcomings of the electoral system and the human rights violations that took place during and after the elections and to bring to justice election officials responsible for election frauds and the law-enforcement officers involved in torture, inhuman treatment, threats and intimidation.
23. Very little, if any, progress in fulfilling any of these demands was observed six months later, in Assembly Resolution 1398 (2004).
24. The local elections held on 17 December 2004 were observed by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Although the general climate was calm, open and friendly, the delegation observed a number of serious irregularities, the nature of which could prejudice the fairness of the electoral process. The Congress delegation also concluded2 that the conditions of the pre-election period, such as the degree of equality of access to the media and level of campaigning, failed to ensure the environment essential for fully democratic elections.
2.2. The legislative framework still needs improvement
25. The
26. However, some important recommendations were not taken into consideration in the final text. First and foremost, it preserved provisions giving the majority party in Parliament an exceptionally strong influence over not only the CEC but all subordinate commissions. However, under the transitional provisions of the Code, which will operate until
27. Following the 2003 presidential elections, a new joint opinion3 was prepared. Adopted in March 2004, it concluded again that the Election Code was still far too complex; that the composition of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Constituency Election Commissions (ConECs) and Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) set out in the Election Code and the transitional provisions, should be revised; that the registration of candidates needed to be dramatically improved; that refusing registration of candidates for presidential election should be well reasoned and exceptional and allow for a fair appeal procedure.
28. Two particular points remained bones of contention: the pre-election gatherings and, according to the law on NGOs, the impossibility for NGOs receiving more than 30% of foreign funding to appoint election observers. Concerning the gatherings, the joint opinion recommended amending not only the Election Code (Art. 86), so that the election commissions be given specific power to recommend to local authorities to provide venues for election rallies under the same conditions for all contenders. The Law on the Freedom of Assembly should equally be amended "to curtail the unlimited powers given to the local authorities to restrict political gatherings and to ensure that genuine freedom of assembly is respected during election periods".
29. After the local elections held in December 2004, the authorities agreed to resume discussions with experts as to possible changes in the electoral legislation ahead of the coming parliamentary elections. The parties agreed on the following agenda: the authorities of
30. The draft amendments to the electoral code were however submitted to the OSCE and Venice Commission experts only towards the end of April 2005. Preliminary comments by individual experts suggest that a substantial part of the joint Venice Commission/ODIHR's recommendations have still not been taken into consideration. For example, no change in the composition of electoral commissions is foreseen.
31. We consider that amending the electoral code in full compliance with the OSCE and Venice Commission's recommendations before the end of June 2005 is fundamental and urgent. With parliament's summer recess starting beginning of July together with the electoral campaign, it seems unlikely that any major changes to the electoral code will indeed be adopted.
2.3. The current situation
32. The rather limited scope of the proposed amendments to the electoral legislation is not surprising. During our meetings in
33. Another major new problem concerning the registration of candidates was raised by several opposition leaders. Although the relevant legal provisions are not very clear, it seems that each candidate would either have to collect a minimum of 450 signatures (Article 147) or pay a registration fee which for these elections will be over 11,000 USD4, not always refundable.
34. Although the use of the deposit/fee is voluntary, many opposition representatives fear that the alternative – presenting 450 signatures – is too unreliable because they can always be invalidated by a biased electoral body. This means that if a party wants to present, for instance, 100 candidates and decides to go for the deposit option, it would have to pay over 1 mln USD!
35. There have not been complaints about this deposit in the past because the previous parliamentary elections were still held under a mixed system, under which there were party lists. Moreover, when the new law was passed in 2003, the minimum monthly salary was 5.20 USD.
36. This situation is clearly unacceptable and will have to be changed before the beginning of the electoral campaign.
37. The CEC assured us that no violations would be allowed; that the accuracy of the voters' lists would be improved. They would gladly participate in the discussions on the improvement of the electoral code between the Presidential administration and the Venice Commission.
3. Pre-election political spectrum
3.1. Political alliances
38. The holding of parliamentary elections, under a majoritarian system has influenced the tactics of both incumbents and opposition. During our last visit, we observed a clear understanding amongst opposition parties that they needed to join forces and present common candidates in every constituency. This is an important positive development.
39. Two major opposition blocs have emerged.
– The "Success" election block unites the Musavat Party (led by Isa Gambar), the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and the progressive wing of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (the latter being led by Ali Kerimli). The triple alliance announced on 18 March that they would present a single list of candidates.
– The Yeni Siyaset – YES (New Policy) electoral bloc was formed on 12 April by a group of prominent political and civic figures. It is led by Lala-Shovket Hadjieva, the leader of the Movement for National Unity; Eldar Namazov, head of the public forum "For the name of Azerbaijan" (both former presidential advisors); the former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Masimov; the former Azerbaijan National Independence Party leader Etibar Mamedov (who was the main opposition candidate in the 1998 presidential elections); and the head of the Movement of the Intelligentsia, Eldaniz Guliev. The bloc advocates a "non-violent transition from a corrupt, authoritarian clanic society to a democracy".
40. A very recent movement "16 October", established on the initiative of the recently released seven political leaders, is not stating for the moment any intention of presenting their own candidates but rather advocates creating the conditions for the conduct of fair and democratic elections. It might at a certain point serve as a bridge between the triple union and YES.
41. In the conversations we had with leaders of all main opposition parties, we also felt a determination to pursue the process by possibly integrating other smaller parties and not presenting competing candidates. This is also a trend that can only be commended on.
42. However, how far the integration will go and how appealing the opposition message will be to the electorate is still an open question. The opposition remains rather weak: some of its leading figures have only just been released from prison but cannot exercise political activity because their sentences were upheld by the Supreme Court (their complaints have now been sent to the European Court of Human Rights); others are in exile; many have lost their jobs. With no access to television and no possibility to organise rallies, their means of reaching people on a large scale are extremely limited.
43. Furthermore, as several political leaders openly recognise, what unites for the moment is mainly the opposition to the authorities, rather than any clear ideology or detailed political programme. In fact, our impression is that they often lack both. This is not surprising, given the precarious conditions in which the opposition has to operate and the fact that no real confrontation of ideas and programmes is happening in the public sphere. This is a deplorable situation, which is totally inadmissible in a democracy.
44. The situation in the ruling circles also might be much more dynamic than what appears on the surface. Several interlocutors suggested that there were different trends within the government and some went as far as speculating that in-fighting within the ruling elite was more substantial than the clash between the government and the opposition. When we asked the General Secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijani Party (YAP) whether it was likely that YAP may come up in certain constituencies with more than one candidate, he did not deny it.
45. For its part, the government clearly realises that it would be impossible to repeat the same mistakes and violations that marred the presidential elections. The strategy of the ruling party, according to some observers, is therefore to create ex nihilo a "constructive" opposition, which would make both the electoral commissions and the future parliament more politically diverse without really being so. One of the most explicit suggestions in this direction was made by the Head of the presidential administration who pronounced himself in favour of a dialogue with the opposition but stressed repeatedly that "there are many other opposition parties" which deserve attention besides the three main ones. New election blocs, such as Media-2005, formed by heads of government-controlled media or the Union of Public Leaders, comprising NGOs, have started mushrooming lately.
46. It would be interesting to see how our colleague Asim Mollazade, who just resigned from PPFA and is creating a party of a new "type" will position himself in this configuration.
3.2. Political dialogue
47. The
48. It is therefore encouraging news that, according to Azer-Press, the first official meeting of the ruling party and the pro-governmental parties, on the one hand, and the opposition parties, on the other hand, took place on 4 May at the
4. Respect of fundamental rights and freedoms
4.1. The right to freedom of peaceful assembly
49. The denial of this right to the opposition since October 2003 is one of the most serious and unacceptable violations of
50. The most explicit was the Head of the
51. One of the recent examples was the refusal of the Baku Mayor's Office to authorise a rally of opposition parties planned for 21 May under the pretext that it would interfere with preparations for the official opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline on 25 May. This time, the opposition decided to nevertheless proceed with the organisation of the rally. In the days preceding it the authorities proceeded to the "preventive" arrest of between 30 and 35 opposition members. Several hundred people gathered peacefully in the streets on 21 May. Some 50 people were arrested, amongst them a prominent leader of a youth organisation, Razi Nurillajev and about 10 were injured.
52. This situation is not only incompatible with democratic standards. Ironically, in the name of peace and tranquillity, the authorities are actually playing with fire. With almost no public outlets for the opposition to get their message through, there is a very strong risk that the frustration that is building up might reach uncontrollable proportions. It is true that almost without exception all the opposition leaders insisted on the need for any form of protest to be peaceful. But in the present atmosphere of total control and with the word "revolution" in everybody's mind underneath, even the smallest provocation could be the sparkle that ignites the fire.
53. Freedom of peaceful assembly is therefore one of the rights that needs to be most urgently guaranteed and both the authorities and the opposition must assume their responsibilities in the matter.
4.2. Freedom of expression
54. When joining the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan undertook to honour the following commitments (cf. the Parliamentary Assembly´s Opinion No. 222 (2000)): "to guarantee freedom of expression and the independence of the media and journalists, and particularly to exclude the use of administrative measures to restrict the freedom of the media" and "to turn the national television channel into a public channel managed by an independent administrative board".
4.2.1. The murder of Elmar Huseynov
55. Elmar Huseynov, editor-in-chief of the weekly magazine Monitor, was shot dead in the entrance of the block of flats in which he lived on 2 March. His widow Rushana Huseynova told us that he had been followed by unknown individuals several times and some of his closest friends even claimed that he knew that he would be murdered.
56. The murder shocked the nation. The President of the Republic was prompt to express serious concern and ask the law-enforcement bodies to find the culprits as soon as possible. He called the murder a serious provocation against the state and accused the perpetrators of damaging the international image of the country. As far as the investigation is concerned, the authorities even asked for international help. Two FBI agents and five experts from the Turkish Interior Ministry Turkish security forces worked for a while in
57. The official investigation quickly came to the conclusion that the crime had to be re-qualified from premeditated murder (120.2.4) into act of terrorism (article 277, attempt upon life of a state or public figure). At the time of our visit, there were already some official indications that Georgian individuals might have been involved. Mr Huseynov's wife complained that she had no information about what was going on. Moreover, she and his closest friends considered it as an attempt to detract public attention from the real commanditeries, who, in their opinion, were in the high echelons of the state apparatus. They also pointed at the fact that Mrs Huseynov, who states her position publicly, had not been invited by the President to his meeting with Mr Huseynov's father on the occasion of the 40th day since the murder of his son.
58. On 3 May a special joint message of the Ministry of National Security, the Home Office and the Procurator General's Office announced that the man suspected of murdering Mr Huseynov was a citizen of
59. Opposition journalists consider this murder as the greatest blow on press freedom so far and acknowledge that it had a huge chilling effect. "Before we were harassed, beaten, held at gunpoint, but not killed. Now we fear for our lives", many of them told us. They are sure that Huseynov was killed for what he wrote and suspect a clear instruction given somewhere in the government to spread fear amongst those who form public opinion. They also request an international investigation similar to the one in the case of Georgi Gongadze in
4.2.2. Opposition press
60. The concept of a big, influential independent broadsheet is still unknown to
61. Rauf Arifoglu, editor-in-chief of the "Yeni Musavat" newspaper and deputy chairman of the Musavat party, is one of the seven political leaders who was jailed following the October 2003 events and has just been pardoned by the President. In December 2004 his editorial team suspended the publication because of too much pressure – court cases and fines. It was recently resumed with its price doubled but all the receipts are under court arrest in order to cover the debts. This is the situation in which many opposition newspapers find themselves. Companies refuse to advertise, printing houses refuse to print them and courts impose disproportionately high fines.
4.2.3. Television
62. Introducing the concept of public service broadcasting in a country which has always had state television and where the newly created commercial channels are almost totally loyal, has not been an easy task. Council of
63. It was only in March 2005 that yet another Presidential Decree transformed the State Television and Radio Company into a joint-stock company. It will initially be 100 percent state-owned; the state will then sell a 49% stake "in further stages" and keep the controlling 51% share.
64. Many serious questions remain: how quickly will the privatisation be completed? How will the independence of the channel be guaranteed if the state keeps the controlling package? Is there going to be eventually full privatisation? In any case, what would be the guarantees that the pie would not simply get divided amongst government supporters? Would the new company be endowed with certain public service functions?
65. For the moment, one thing is clear: nothing has changed for the viewer. AzTV1 and AzTV2 still run the same service, with the same logos and the same editorial policy which excludes any controversy and any participation of the opposition.
66. The nine members of the board of the Public TV have now been confirmed by Parliament and Ismail Omarov, member of Milli Mejlis and editor-in-chief of the Social and political programs department of AzTV1 has been elected General Director. The team is now meeting almost every day but there is no certainty as to when the new TV will start operating. The Director assured us that it would be in September at the latest; other influential sources were even indicating mid-summer as a starting date.
67. At the time that we met the board and the General Director, they were still expecting the State to give them premises and to ensure funding. The premises of the State TV would be split and they would be given the radio part, hoping to have their own premises in the future. Collecting licence fees would not be possible until 2011 but there were safeguards in the law so that the annual budget voted by parliament could only grow. The General Director assured us that after the audit of all the assets of the State TV he would claim at least 50%. They will also make sure they are given a frequency that covers the whole country, according to the law.
68. The Chairman of the Board, professor of journalism, pointed out that in terms of quality, it would not be very difficult for the Public TV to be better than the current TV, but that the real challenge was to bring it up to European standards. He assured us that it would be "impartial, accurate, conscientious and balanced". However, we could not hear many specific ideas related to the concept of public service broadcasting – we heard, for instance, that the staff will have to make an oath, like the doctors, and at the opening of the programmes would be singing the national anthem.
69. The Board and the director showed determination to cover the election campaign from Day 1. They will also broadcast in minority languages, maybe even in Armenian.
70. According to many sources however, the board and the director are loyal to the country's leadership. Amongst civil society, journalists and the opposition there is pronounced scepticism about the independence of the channel.
71. This is why a group of Azeri journalists and political figures are now trying to create a new TV channel named Yeni TV which would offer an alternative to the state-controlled television and to the loyal commercial broadcasters by providing unbiased information. Amongst the founders are the former presidential adviser Eldar Namazov and Arif Aliyev, head of the independent journalists' union Yeni Nesil and one of the founders two years ago of the Press Council. This ambitious project from the outset ran into difficulties: according to the current legislation, it has to be first registered by the Justice Ministry and then apply for a broadcasting licence. When we met Mr Aliyev, he had been awaiting the decision of the Ministry of Justice for a month. We asked the question in the Ministry and were told that the documentation submitted by the co-founders had not respected the letter of the law and that therefore corrections were necessary. The founders may submit new documents but, as they want to start broadcasting as soon as possible in order to be operational in the run-up to the elections, they are now considering satellite transmission from another country.
72. Another development has been the evolution of the commercial channel ANS TV, which over the last couple of months has become unusually critical, for example qualifying the
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